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The EU Emissions Trading Scheme 




The upcoming European Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) is one of the more 
controversial climate policy instruments. Predictions about its likely impact and 
its performance can at present only be made to a certain degree. As long as 
the National Allocations Plans are not finally settled the overall supply of 
allowances is not determined. In this paper, we will identify key features and 
key impacts of the EU ETS by scanning the range of likely allocation plans 
using the simulation model DART. The analysis of the simulation results 
highlights a number of interesting details in terms of allowance trade flows 
between Member States, of allowance prices, and in terms of the role of the 
accession countries in the ETS. An important finding about the impact of the 
new ETS with respect to achieving emission reductions more efficiently, i.e. at 
lower cost, is that savings can only be realized if the cap on emissions is 
distributed between the ETS sector and the rest of the economy in such a way 
that the different abatement costs are taken into account. This would imply a 
relatively small allocation of emissions to the ETS sector. The second 
important result concerns the role of the accession countries. Even if they do 
not supply their hot-air in the ETS market, they contribute substantially to the 
cost savings of the ETS by offering low cost abatement options. 
 
Keywords:   EU emissions trading scheme, permit allocation, Kyoto targets, 
computable general equilibrium model, DART  
JEL classification: D58, F18, Q48, Q54   2
1. Introduction 
 
When the European Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) for CO2 will start in 
2005, it will be known as one of the more controversial climate policy 
instruments. While proponents advocate its contribution to meeting the 
European Kyoto targets at minimal costs, opponents including some policy 
makers and industry claim that it will lead to negative competitiveness effects 
for the participating sectors. Currently the ETS covers around 13 000 energy-
intensive installations in the European Union which are responsible for roughly 
45 percent of all CO2-emissions in the EU (European Commission 2001). As of 
today, there is considerable uncertainty about the impact of this trading 
scheme when it is in full operation and when the commitments of the Member 
States of the EU to the Kyoto-Protocol will need to be met in 2012. 
Consequently, speculations sprout about winners and losers among the 
Member States, about costs to different sectors within Members States as well 
as about the question as to which Member State will be a net-seller and which 
one a net-buyer of emission allowances. Also, the range of prices for emission 
allowances is still wide open. In fact, many statements about the likely 
outcome of the ETS are more based on the desire to further ones commercial 
interest than on a balanced analysis of the evidence available so far. Almost 
all existing quantitative simulation studies only analyse preliminary scenarios 
of the ETS that, for example, do not include the accession countries 
(Böhringer 2002, Capros et al. 2000 & 2002) or do not account for different 
likely allocation modes (Criqui & Kitous 2003).  
Predictions about the likely impact and the performance of the European ETS 
depend on the details of the allocation of emission rights within each Member 
State. As long as the National Allocation Plans of the Member States are not 
finally settled the overall supply of CO2-emission allowances is not determined. 
This obviously influences the price level for allowances. In addition, allocation 
rules that differ between Member States will also influence trade flows.  
   3
Generally, the EU proposes three approaches to determine the allowance 
allocation. In the historical approach, the number of allowances allocated to 
the ETS sectors is determined by multiplying their emission share in a 
particular base year with the target emissions according to the Kyoto Protocol. 
In the forecasting approach, allowances are allocated according to business-
as-usual shares expected at some future point in time. The least-cost 
approach finally takes into account differences in abatement costs in and 
outside the ETS. The issues associated with allocating the caps will be 
discussed below in greater detail.  
The second uncertainty concerns the fact that the impact of the EU ETS will 
exercise its full force in 2012. It is therefore necessary to assess the ETS in 
the light of the EU economy in the future; to be precise we choose 2012. This 
will be done with the help of the DART-model (Klepper, Peterson, Springer 
2003), a computable general equilibrium model calibrated for the enlarged EU. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to identify key features and key impacts of the EU 
ETS by scanning the range of likely allocation plans and by using a simulation 
analysis with the DART-model. This approach at the moment ignores some 
institutional details of the ETS such as the possibility for using the flexible 
mechanisms set out in the Kyoto-Protocol, i.e. Joint Implementation (JI) or the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) which can potentially offer further 
inexpensive abatement options. It also ignores intertemporal issues such as 
banking and borrowing. Despite these omissions, the analysis highlights a 
number of interesting details about the EU ETS in terms of allowance trade 
flows between Member States, of allowance prices, and in terms of the role of 
the accession countries in the ETS. 
In the following, we first summarize the background of the EU ETS and the 
international climate policy commitments of the EU. We then describe the 
DART-model and the way in which the ETS is implemented in this simulation 
model. Finally, we discuss the results of the simulation exercises and draw 
some conclusions.   4
2. The European Kyoto Targets and the European Emissions Trading 
Scheme  
In the Kyoto Protocol from 1997, the EU agreed to cut down their overall GHG 
emissions relative to the 1990 level by 8 percent in the period from 2008 to 
2012
1. In 1998, the EU differentiated this target between their different 
Member States in the so-called EU Burden Sharing Agreement. The idea was 
that cohesion Member States such as Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece are 
given lighter burdens, compared to richer Member States. They are thus 
allowed to increase their relatively small emissions while other EU Member 
States stabilise or reduce emissions. The accession countries that will join the 
EU in May 2004 and presumably in 2007 are not included in the Burden 
Sharing Agreement but have their own individual Kyoto targets. The targets of 
all EU Member States and accession countries are shown in figure 1.  
Figure 1 — EU Kyoto Targets According to the Burden Sharing Agreement 
                                                           
1  The 8 percent target comprises only the “Kyoto gases” CO2, CH4, N2O, HCFs, PCFs SF6. 
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To reach the European commitments at minimal costs a European Emissions 
trading scheme (ETS) for CO2 was designed that is at the heart of this paper.
2 
The ETS will start in 2005 and all Member States of the European Union will 
be required to impose binding, absolute caps on CO2 emissions of facilities in 
energy activities, oil refineries, the production, and processing of ferrous and 
non-ferrous metals, the mineral industry and the pulp, paper and board 
production. The first trading period until 2007 is seen as a test for the second 
period from 2008-2012 that coincidences with the first Kyoto commitment 
period.  
Even though an important step, the EU ETS alone cannot guarantee a cost 
effective reduction as it only covers the energy intensive industrial sectors and 
only one of the greenhouse gases, CO2. The overall costs of the Kyoto target 
also depend on the emission reductions that are achieved in sectors and 
gases not covered by the ETS. If, for example, fearing negative 
competitiveness effects, the Member States generously endow the sectors 
inside the ETS with emission permits, this implies that more emission 
reductions are necessary outside the trading scheme. To guarantee the cost 
effectiveness of the EU Kyoto strategy, the allocation of permits to the ETS 
has thus to account for the abatement costs and abatement potentials in Non-
ETS sectors and for non-CO2 greenhouse gases.  
The allocation of permits to the ETS is subject of the so-called National 
Allocation Plan (NAP) that, according to the EU directive, each Member State 
has to prepare before the beginning of each of the two trading periods from 
2005-2007 and 2008-2012. For the first period, the NAP has to be submitted 
by the end of March 2004. In the NAP, each country has to determine the total 
quantity of allowances in the ETS and to decide how it intends to allocate them 
to individual operators. The directive also mentions explicitly that the total 
quantity of allowances has to be consistent with the Kyoto emission targets of 
each country and with the assessments of actual and projected progress 
towards fulfilling the Member States contributions to the Community's 
                                                           
2   For a summary of the EU Directive (European Union 2003) that establishes the ETS see   6
commitments. This is stressed again in the communication from the 
Commission on guidance to assist the Member States in establishing their 
NAPs (European Commission 2004). Within three month, the Commission can 
reject a plan and ask for changes to be made. Member States have, through 
the “Steering Committee”, also a saying in the other Member States’ NAPs. In 
a final step, each Member State has to take its final decision on the NAP.  
To help the Member States establish the NAPs the EU Commission has 
published a ''Non-Paper'' (European Commission 2003) in which a step-by-
step process to develop a NAP is outlined. The paper suggests that the first 
step should be to establish the share of the total allowable emissions under 
the Kyoto Protocol that will be allocated to the installations covered by the 
trading scheme in a “top-down” economy-wide analysis. In a next step, it is 
then suggested to collect data from the single installations and companies in a 
“bottom-up” approach. The allocation of permits to each individual sector is 
finally determined based on current, historical or average emissions for a 
certain year.  We will address possible allocation modes in more detail in 
section 3.2.  
We will ignore in the following the problem of non-CO2 gases and focus on the 
question of reductions inside the ETS versus reductions outside and discuss 
the implications of the different allocation approaches. In addition, we will look 
at the role of the accession countries. Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia and Romania, Malta and Cyprus as well as the 
three Baltic States will become official members of the EU
3. As EU members, 
these countries will also enter the EU ETS. This will influence the costs of 
achieving the European Kyoto target in two ways. First, these countries offer 
abatement opportunities that are much cheaper than in the current EU. 
Second, due to the economic recession in the 90ies, Eastern Europe's 
emissions are now below their Kyoto target. Selling some of their excess 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
e.g. Gagelmann and Hansjürgens (2002). 
3   Except for the candidate countries Bulgaria and Romania, these countries will join the EU 
in May 2004. For Bulgaria and Romania accession to the EU is scheduled for 2007, the 
beginning of the second trading period of the ETS.    7
emission allowances (called hot-air) into the European ETS would further drive 
down the permit price and the economic costs in Western Europe. 
3.  Simulating the Effects of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme  
An assessment of the likely allocation and welfare effects of the ETS requires 
at least two modelling steps. The first consists of the setting up of an 
appropriate economic model with which the European economy can be 
simulated for the time in which the trading scheme will be in full force. The 
second step involves the design of policy scenarios, which are likely to arise 
between today and the time at which the Kyoto-Commitments are to be met. 
As a simulation tool, we use the DART-model (Klepper, Peterson, Springer 
2003), which will be shortly characterized. We then derive the emission caps 
for the different Member States that need to be met by 2012. 
3.1   The DART-Model 
The DART (Dynamic Applied Regional Trade) Model is a multi-region, multi-
sector recursive dynamic CGE-model of the world economy. For the simulation 
of the European ETS, it is calibrated to an aggregation of 16 regions. Table 1 
illustrates the nine countries or group of countries of the EU including the 
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Table 1 — Regions in DART 
BEN Belgium,  Luxembourg, Netherlands 
DEU Germany 
FRA France 
GBR United  Kingdom 
ITA Italy 
SCA  Denmark, Finland, Sweden 
SEU  Greece, Portugal, Spain 
REU Austria,  Ireland 
ACC*  Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia 
Other regions   
USA  United States of America 
FSU*  Former Soviet Union 
OAB  Other Annex B-countries (not in EU) 
MEA  Middle East, North Africa 
CPA China,  Hong-Kong 
IND India 
ROW  Rest of the World 
*The region ACC includes Bulgaria and Romania for which the accession in 2007 
is planned but not decided. It excludes the Baltic Countries which are aggregated 
in region FSU. This is due to the regional disaggregation of the current GTAP data 
set. This inconsistency has only a small effect since it distorts CO2-emissions of 
ACC by less than 5 percent. 
 
In each region or country, the economy is disaggregated into 12 sectors. Four 
of these sectors participate in the ETS. Although there is no perfect match 
between the installations subject to the ETS and the sectoral structure of 
DART, we believe it to be sufficiently close
4. In addition, the ETS in DART 
covers about 45  percent of the CO2-emissions, which coincides with the 
estimates of the European Commission (2001). 
 
                                                           
4 As even some of the NAPs released by now are not entirely clear about which installations 
are included in the ETS, it is hard to assess how close the accordance actually is.   9
Table 2 — Sector Structure in DART 
ETS-sectors   
OIL Refined  Oil  Products 
EGW Electricity 
PPP  Pulp and Paper Products 
IMS   Iron, Metal, and Steel (including the cement industry)  
Other sectors   
COL Coal  Extraction 
GAS  Natural Gas Production and Distribution 
CRU Crude  Oil  Production 
CEP Chemicals  Products 
AGR Agricultural  Products 
TRN Transport  Industries 
MOB Transportation  Services 
OTH  Other Manufactures and Services 
The economy in each region is modelled as a competitive economy with 
flexible prices and market clearing. There exist three types of agents: a 
representative consumer, a representative producer in each sector, and 
regional governments. All regions are connected through bilateral trade flows. 
The DART-model has a recursive-dynamic structure solving for a sequence of 
static one-period equilibria. The major exogenous drivers are the rate of 
productivity growth, the savings rate, the rate of change of the population, and 
the change in human capital.  
The model is calibrated to the GTAP5 data base (Dimaranan & McDougall 
2002) that represents production and trade data for 1997. The elasticities of 
substitution for the energy goods coal, gas, and crude oil are calibrated in such 
a way as to reproduce the emission projections of the EIA (EIA 2002).
5 
 
                                                           
5   For more details about DART, see e.g. Springer (2002) or Klepper et al. (2003).   10
3.2    Integration of Policy Scenarios in DART 
The simulation of the ETS requires first a determination of the emission caps 
for the EU Member States. Table 3 shows the Kyoto targets for each region or 
country based on the EU Burden Sharing Agreement to the Kyoto-Protocol 
(also see Figure 1).
6 The cap on country groups is the emission weighted 
average. The first column represents the percentage reduction required 
relative to 1990. The second column is derived from the business-as-usual 
(BAU) run of DART up to 2012 and represents the reduction required in 2012 
relative to the BAU in 2012. 
Table 3 – EU Kyoto Targets Relative to 1990 and 2012 Emissions  
  % Reduction target relative to 
Country/Region  1990 (Burden Sharing)  2012  (BAU in  DART) 
SCA -5.1    -7.7 
DEU -21.0    -11.3 
GBR -12.5 -12.9 
BEN -7.4  -24.0 
FRA 0.0  -11.3 
ITA -6.5  -15.9 
SEU +18.4 -11.9 
REU -4.1  -31.4 
EU15 -8.0  -14.2 
ACC  -7.0  Hot-Air of ca. 165 Mt CO2 
  
The BAU is calibrated to the climate policy measures enacted up to the 2001. 
Hence, it includes the impact of policies such as the German eco-tax or the 
national emissions trading schemes. From 2002 on, BAU keeps these policies 
in place but does not include any new climate policies. 
So far, only the economy-wide emission targets have been computed. The 
ETS, however, requires targets, which are set for the sectors involved in the 
trading scheme. The European Directive leaves it up to the Member States to   11
determine within their National Allocation Plans (NAP) which proportion of the 
emission reduction is to be supplied by those sectors participating within the 
ETS, and which proportion is supplied from the rest of the economy. The 
Commission of the EU suggests three modes of allocating targets in its non-
paper (European Commission 2003): 
•  The “historical emissions approach” (HIS) 
•  The “forecasting approach” (FUT) 
•  The “least cost approach” (LC). 
In the historical approach, the total number of allowances allocated to the ETS 
installations is determined by multiplying the share of emissions of ETS 
installations in a particular base year (e.g. 2000) with the total allowable 
emissions in the economy. This approach together with the choice of a recent 
base year penalizes sectors or industries, which have engaged in early action 
prior to the base year. In the forecasting approach, allowances are allocated 
according to the business-as-usual shares expected at some future point in 
time, for example the end of the first commitment period to the Kyoto-Protocol 
in 2012. This system would in some way reflect the fact that due to exogenous 
forces sectors in the economy are growing at different speeds and these 
needs were reflected in the allocation plan. On the other hand, it would 
penalize those sectors that have already taken early action and are on a 
slower growth path with respect to GHG-emissions. Finally, the least cost 
approach tries to take into account the fact that CO2-abatement activities carry 
substantially different costs in different sectors. From an efficiency point of 
view, this would not matter if all emission sources were to participate in the 
trading scheme. However, since abatement costs will equalize only within the 
ETS, there is a danger that the historical and the forecasting approach may 
lead to strong differences in marginal abatement costs between the sectors 
within ETS and those outside the ETS. The least cost approach tries to take 
account of this inefficiency by dividing the cap between ETS and non-ETS 
sectors in such a way that the different abatement cost levels are recognized. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
6   ACC does not participate in the Burden Sharing Agreement.   12
Hence, the least-cost approach allocates relatively few allowances to sectors 
with low abatement costs. 
The three allocation modes have been implemented in DART in the following 
way: For the historical allocation mode the share of the ETS-sectors in 2000 
has been derived from the BAU run which includes climate policy measures 
taken up to 2001. In the forecasting mode, the BAU run was extended up to 
the year 2012 and the shares of that year are used to compute the division of 
allowances between the ETS installations and those outside. For the least cost 
approach, we compute for each country or region an efficient abatement 
scenario, which meets the caps of the Kyoto-Protocol in 2012. This can 
equally well be done with a uniform national CO2-tax or a comparable nation-
wide emissions trading scheme. The resulting emission shares in 2012 are 
used to determine the allocation of allowances to the different sectors in the 
ETS. This approach leads to a unilaterally efficient allocation of allowances; 
hence, there would be no permit trade within a country. However, as soon as 
trading starts between Member States only those sectors participating in the 
ETS can gain from trading. 
As the least-cost scenario does only account for differences in abatement 
costs across single Member States, we run one additional scenario where the 
Kyoto targets are reached at minimal European costs. In the OPT scenario the 
Kyoto allowances in each Member State are allocated to the ETS and non-
ETS sectors in such a way that marginal abatements costs are equalized 
across all sectors and Member States. In other words in this scenario the CO2 
tax that is necessary to reach the non-ETS targets is in each Member State 
equal to the emerging allowance price in the ETS. The OPT scenario is rather 
academic as countries would have to know abatement costs in all countries 
and to anticipate trade flows but it can act as a benchmark. 
Figure 2 summarizes the allocation of allowances to the ETS sectors in the 
different countries/regions according to the four allocation rules relative to the 
business-as-usual emissions (BAU) without the Kyoto-targets in place. It turns 
out that under the OPT allocation rule the lowest targets are allocated followed   13
by the least-cost allocation rule (LC)
7. This is due to the fact that the 
installations within the ETS have lower abatement costs than those outside. 
Therefore, under a unilaterally efficient and even more so under an efficient 
policy at the European scale the ETS must accept a larger emission reduction 
than the sectors outside. 










Under the historical approach (HIS), the targets are slightly higher than the LC 
targets indicating that the ETS sectors have a somewhat larger share in 
emissions than that of the least-cost-approach. The two exceptions, Germany 
(DEU) and Denmark, Sweden, and Finland (SCA) are of special interest. They 
experience slightly lower targets in scenario HIS. Yet, this is only the case 
because the year 2000 was chosen whereas for reference years in the early 
Nineties the ETS sectors had a significantly higher share in emissions. This 
indicates that the ETS sectors in Germany and the Nordic countries have been 
engaged in early action to a larger degree than the other Member States and 
the non-trading sectors within their countries. Finally, the ETS sectors would 
receive the largest amount of allowances under the forecasting approach, 
mainly due to the fact that in the business-as-usual scenario the emissions of 
these sectors grow faster than those outside. 
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A final distinction in the different scenarios needs to be made for the accession 
countries, i.e. the region ACC in the DART model. The region ACC has a 
Kyoto target of –7 percent reduction relative to 1990 for the year 2012. The 
business-as-usual run of DART computes 730 Mt CO2 in 2012, which is 
18.5 percent below the Kyoto-target. Hence, the accession countries possess 
hot-air in the order of about 165 Mt CO2. As shown in Figure 2, the historical 
as well as the forecasting approach allow for some of this hot-air to be sold in 
the ETS. We chose not to include hot-air and assume that the emission targets 
are set at the business-as-usual level. To illustrate the other extreme, we 
assume in one additional scenario that all hot-air is allocated to the trading 
sectors.  
In the following we concentrate on the “least-cost” allocation rule for reasons 
that will be apparent in the discussion of the results in section 4.1. Our central 
scenario is the one with least-cost targets of the EU15 and the accession 
countries participating in the ETS with their 2012 BAU emissions  (scenario 
LC). 
4. Simulation  Results 
In this section, we present the results from simulating the scenarios described 
in the previous section. We present the results of the DART-model for the year 
2012 when the ETS is in full force and the Kyoto-targets under the EU Burden 
Sharing Agreement need to be met. We first report and discuss the results for 
the allowance prices. Then we show the trade in allowances across the EU. 
Finally, we take a look at the changes in sectoral output and the expected 
competitiveness and welfare effects.  
4.1    Allowance Prices  
One of the major outcomes of the EU ETS that will determine its trade and 
welfare effects is a uniform allowance price, i.e. a price on CO2, throughout the 
EU. Current estimates vary between 5 and 30€2000/tCO2. In the simulations   15
with DART
8 the price in the central scenario turns out to be 11.1 €2000/tCO2. 
Over all scenarios, it varies between 6.8 and 21.0 €2000/tCO2. Figure 3 shows 
the allowance prices in the different scenarios. The first block indicates the 
prices under the different allocation rules OPT, LC, HIS, and FUT as described 
in section 3. The second block compares permit prices if only the old EU-15 
countries are trading, if all EU members trade but no hot-air is traded, and if 
the hot-air of the accession countries is also traded (all under the assumption 
of least-cost targets). 
 











Stricter targets for the installations in the ETS naturally lead to higher 
allowance prices. As a result of the lax emission target for the ETS sectors 
under the forecasting approach (FUT) the price turns out roughly half the price 
of the OPT scenario and one third lower than under the least-cost approach 
(LC). The choice of a certain reference year for determining targets can have a 
considerable effect as the year 2000 in scenario HIS and 2012 in scenario 
FUT show. Figure 3 also illustrates the importance of the accession countries 
for the trading scheme. Trading among the old EU members only (EU15) 
would result in a permit price of 21 €2000, whereas the low cost abatement 
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options in the accession countries (LC) would bring prices down to 11 €2000. If 
these countries also sell their hot-air (HA), they would bring down the 
allowance prices to slightly below 7 €2000. 
The future scenario (FUT) is based on expected business as usual emissions 
in 2012. Since the abatement cost functions in the sectors outside the ETS are 
much steeper than those of the sectors inside the allowance price of 7 €2000 
goes hand in hand with an average emission tax outside the ETS of almost 
40 €2000 (see Figure 4 that shows the emission weighted average tax that 
needs to be imposed in the different scenarios compared to the allowance 
price). Similarly, when the year 2000 emissions are chosen for the allocation of 
allowances permit prices of 9 €2000 coexist with average emission taxes of 
almost 32 €2000. In both cases, the allocation of emissions to the ETS is not 
based on abatement costs but only on actual or expected emissions. The 
divergence between the allowance price [11 €2000] and the tax outside the ETS 
[23 €2000] is smallest in the least-cost scenario. In general, the more allowance 
price and tax rate converge, the larger are the efficiency gains in the different 
scenarios. The remaining difference between the allowance price and the 
taxes indicates the cost minimizing potential that a particular scenario leaves 
unexploited as compared to the theoretical optimum (OPT) where marginal 
costs are equalized across sectors all over Europe. In fact, these numbers 
tend to underestimate the gains from trading since it is unlikely that the climate 
policies pursued outside the ETS will be conducted through an efficient 
emission tax. Under other less efficient regimes the implicit taxes necessary 
for achieving the same emission target would be significantly higher thus 
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Figure 4  —  Emission  Weighted  Average Tax Rates Outside the ETS 












The taxes in the single Member States are approximately the same as the 
taxes under unilateral action, which are shown in the next section. Except for 
the EU15 scenario, the tax is in all EU15 countries always above the 
allowance price.  
 
Altogether, the simulations clearly indicate the importance of the allocation rule 
of targets for the level of prices in the ETS but also for the burden of 
abatement costs that is subsequently imposed upon the sectors not 
participating in the ETS. In fact, under all three allocation rules there are strong 
incentives for sectors to participate in the ETS. The simulations also reveal 
that the least-cost allocation rule results in the smallest distortions between the 
sectors inside the ETS and those outside. 
4.2   Trade in Emission Permits 
Abatement costs for CO2 vary not only within a country but to an even larger 
degree across countries. As can be seen in Figure 5, there are essentially four 
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their EU Burden Sharing targets without emissions trading. The highest costs 
occur in the Benelux countries plus Ireland and Austria with around 50 
€2000/tCO2. Italy and the UK have abatement costs of about 25 €2000/tCO2 
whereas the other current EU countries (France, Germany, Southern Europe 
except Italy, and Scandinavia) cost amount to 14 to 16 €2000/tCO2. Finally, the 
accession countries, by definition, have zero cost of abatement as they have 
no binding target in 2012. 
Figure 5 — CO2-Taxes Under Unilateral Action 
25,0 


















The differences in the CO2 taxes are due to a number of factors such as the 
size of the emission cap relative to the BAU emissions, the availability of 
inexpensive abatement options, or to the availability of hot-air. They show the 
potential for cost savings and also indicate the likely trade flows, even though 
the latter are determined by the marginal cost in the ETS sectors only.  
The ETS of the EU turns out to lead to a rather lopsided affair. The accession 
countries will export allowances to all other Member States. Figure 6 illustrates 
the amount of allowances traded within the ETS. The only exporters are the 
accession countries (ACC). The overall amount of allowances available in the 
ETS under the “least-cost-principle” and without the inclusion of hot-air is   19
1140 Mt CO2. Out of this 130 Mt CO2 will be net exports from ACC, i.e. net 
trade amounts to roughly 11 percent of emissions in the ETS.  


















The accession countries with allocated allowances amounting to their 
business-as-usual emissions have available 480 Mt CO2 of which they export 
27 percent. These exports go predominantly to the large countries UK, 
Germany, and France but also to the Benelux Countries. However, relative to 
their domestic endowments Austria and Ireland combined will be the largest 
importers by having 33 percent of their consumed allowances imported. The 
Benelux Countries come in second with an import quota of 27 percent. In 
comparison, France and Germany import around 6 percent of the emission 
allowances consumed and the southern regions (SEU) and the Scandinavian 
Member States (SCA) import only around 3.5 percent. 
Figure 6 also shows that the trade in allowances will be dominated by the 
electricity sector (EGW). With the exception of France because of its large 
share of nuclear energy in electricity consumption, more than 75 percent of 
exports and imports will come from and go to the electricity sector. The rest is   20
dominated by imports from the iron, metal and steel sector (IMS) with pulp and 
paper products (PPP) and refined oil products (OIL) almost negligible. 
There have been speculations about the likely trade structure that would 
emerge without the accession countries. Figure 7 illustrates this case. Since 
the low cost option from the accession countries is not available, the above-
mentioned group of countries with the low abatement costs among the EU-15 
(France, Germany, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Denmark, Finland, Sweden) 
would be exporters with most of the exports coming from Germany and the 
southern countries (except Italy). The largest importers would be the Benelux 
countries. This restricted EU-15 trading scheme would lower the marginal 
abatement cost from an average of 23 €2000/tCO2 in the no-trading case with 
efficient unilateral abatement to 21  €2000/tCO2. These 2 €2000/tCO2 can be 
viewed as a measure of the efficiency gain from trading. In contrast, the permit 
price in the full trading scheme (including ACC) is only 11 €2000/tCO2. This 
illustrates the tremendous efficiency gains from including the ACC country 
group
9.  
Figure 7 —  EU-15 Trading Without the Accession Countries  - Allowance Net 


















                                                           
9  These permit prices reflect efficiency gains since they do not contain hot-air.   21
 
 
It should be noted though that these results are partly sensitive against 
different ETS emission targets in the EU-15. Assuming for example the less 
stringent historical allocation, lowers the allowance price to 16.4 23 €2000/tCO2 
which is slightly above the German unilateral abatement costs (see figure 5). 
As a result, Germany would export almost no allowances.  
 
4.3  Competitiveness Effects 
A major concern of policy makers and industry is that the ETS will have 
negative competitiveness effects for the participating sectors. There are three 
important points in this context. First of all, it should be clear that any 
competitiveness effects are not a result of the ETS but of the emission 
restrictions implied by the Kyoto target. The ETS is indeed lowering the 
negative effects of reaching this target compared to pure unilateral action (see 
section 4.2 and 4.4). Second, the simulation results show that altogether the 
competitiveness effects of the ETS and the Kyoto targets are relatively small. 
Finally, it is not true, that the competitiveness of sectors covered by the ETS is 
affected more than the competitiveness of the sectors outside
10. 
The cross-country flows of CO2-allowances from the accession countries 
towards the West indicate that the ETS will in the first place allow the energy-
intensive installations within the trading scheme to reduce emissions and 
consequently production to a lesser degree than under a unilateral climate 
policy scenario (UNI) in which the EU Burden Sharing targets need to be met 
independently. Simulations with the DART-model show that this is the case but 
it also carries over to sectors not included in the ETS. Figure 8 shows the 
output effect of the EU Burden Sharing Agreement for the importing countries, 
                                                           
10  In this paper, we focus on the competitive advantage relative to countries or regions 
outside the EU. Another important issue concerns the competitive advantage of one EU 
Member State over another state, for example when NAPs are used strategically as it seems 
to be the case with several plans submitted to the Commission. This would be an important 
research topic as soon as the NAPs of all member states have been made public. Here, we   22
i.e. the EU-15. We have selected the energy sectors in the ETS [Oil products 
(OIL), Electricity (EGW)], energy outside the ETS [coal extraction (COL), gas 
production and distribution (GAS)], energy-intensive sectors in the ETS [iron, 
metal and steel (IMS), pulp and paper products (PPP)], and energy-intensive 
sectors outside the ETS [chemicals (CEP), transport sector (MOB)]. The non-
energy intensive sectors outside the ETS (AGR, TRN, OTH) are not included 
as output changes are negligible. In Figure 8, the light grey bar represents 
output losses in LC, whereas the losses under UNI are the sum of the light and 
the dark grey bar. The dark grey bar thus shows the losses that can be 
avoided by implementing the emissions trading scheme.   









The most remarkable result from comparing the ETS with a unilateral climate 
policy is the fact that all energy-intensive sectors gain from the ETS. Of 
course, the energy sectors and the energy-intensive industries inside the ETS 
can reduce their output losses by more than 50 percent. However, via lower 
prices in intermediates and energy inputs, these cost savings also carry over 
to the other energy-intensive industries to some extent. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
always assume for simplicity and because of a lack of information that all Member States 





































Looking at the sectoral data in more detail, there are only a few exceptions in 
the EU15 where a sector loses due to emissions trading. In most cases 
though, the losses are very small or occur in sectors that still gain in the LC 
scenario relative to BAU. The only cases worth mentioning are the 1.1 percent 
loss of the refined oil production in LC relative to UNI in EU-Scandinavia and 
Germany. They result from a shift of production to the Benelux countries that 
profit most from the ETS compared to unilateral action. In the accession 
countries, the picture is different. They face no emission constraints in the UNI 
scenario and can even profit from a shift of carbon intensive production away 
from the EU15. If they are participating in the ETS, their ETS sectors are 
constrained in their emissions as well and they have to consider the option of 
cutting down production and selling allowances. Moreover, due to cost savings 
in the EU15 and changes in relative prices, some production is shifted back 
from the accession countries to the EU15. Altogether, output in the ETS 
sectors and some sectors outside, decreases under emissions trading 
compared to the unilateral reduction case. The welfare effects for ACC are 
discussed in the next section in more detail. 
Figure 8 also shows that the decreases in total output in the EU are only by 
around 0.3 percent. The effects on all non-energy sectors are below 2 percent 
in each country. In the energy intensive sectors outside the ETS (chemical and 
mobility sector) there are two exceptions, which are the Benelux countries and 
the Rest of Europe. Here the output losses reach 11 and 5 percent. This is due 
to the comparatively high emission intensity of these sectors in the EU. For 
example, in the chemical sector in the Benelux countries, energy intensive 
fertilizer production plays an important role.  
The losses are naturally higher in the energy sectors coal and gas whether 
they are covered by the ETS or not. The restrictions on CO2-emissions 
naturally reduce demand for fossil energy sources and thus reduce output in 
those extraction industries. In addition, coal is the most emission intensive 
fossil fuel, which is substituted by low carbon energy under emission 
restrictions.    24
Finally, Figure 8 shows that the sectors inside the ETS clearly gain from an 
emissions trading scheme and are thus affected less from climate policy than 
the sectors outside the ETS. There are three reasons for this 
(1) Competitiveness  effects  depend on the exposure of a sector to the world 
market. Some of the sectors most exposed to the world market such as the 
chemical sector are outside the ETS. The detailed sectoral data show 
indeed that in the unilateral scenario the chemical sector suffers more than 
the IMS and PPP sector inside the ETS.  
(2)  The sectors outside the ETS are indirectly affected by the emission 
restrictions inside the ETS as well. In another paper, Peterson (2003) 
shows that these indirect effects that originate from changes in gross 
energy prices and demand or from prices of intermediate inputs in some 
cases even dominate the direct effects from the ETS or the other climate 
policies.  
(3) Reaching the Kyoto targets requires severe reductions outside the ETS as 
well. As shown already in section 4.1, taxes that are associated with these 
reductions are much higher than the allowance price. As a result, the 
sectors outside the ETS are affected more strongly than the sectors inside.  
Finally it should be noted, that the strength of the effects differs between 
individual countries. Some of the main factors that influence this strength are 
discussed in the next section. In addition, the differences in the energy 
intensity as e.g. described for the chemical sector in the Benelux countries do 
play a role. For more details, see also Peterson (2003).  
4.4  The Welfare Costs of Different EU Climate Strategies 
The main goal of the EU emissions trading scheme is to reduce the welfare 
costs of meeting the European emission targets. Figure 9 shows the 
aggregated EU welfare changes relative to the BAU scenario in the different 
trading scenarios compared to a scenario where the individual commitments 
are reached unilaterally by a uniform, country specific CO2 tax (UNI).   25
First of all, if optimally designed, the ETS leads indeed to cost savings. While 
the EU on average loses 1.1 percent welfare under unilateral action, this 
reduces to 0.4 percent under an optimal allocation (scenario OPT) and still to 
0.9 percent in scenario LC. One important result of our simulations is though, 
that the goal of cost reductions is achieved only if the allocation of allowances 
to the ETS is geared to the least cost allocation. Comparing the welfare impact 
of reaching the Kyoto-target unilaterally with the two other trading scenarios 
based on actual and expected emission shares reveals no welfare gain. 
Apparently, the distortions created through the divergence of abatement costs 
between sectors inside and outside the ETS are of the same magnitude as the 
gains from trading within the ETS. These distortions are not present in the 
unilateral scenario, which is created under the – admittedly unrealistic – 
assumption of a uniform national CO2-tax. Nevertheless, the results clearly 
indicate that distortionary allocation plans can quickly amount to welfare losses 
larger than the gains from trading themselves. 
Figure 9 also shows that without the cheap abatement options in the 
accession countries, the ETS would offer practically no efficiency gains. Again, 
the welfare gains from the trading regime are balanced by the distortions 
emerging from the difference in abatement costs between ETS installations 
and emitters outside the ETS. If we include the hot-air of the accession 
countries in the ETS, the welfare losses can be reduced to 0.7 percent. 
However, this gain is due to the fact that the overall amount of emissions is 
substantially higher than in the trading scheme without hot-air.  
Turning to the economic costs for the individual EU Member States, these can 
differ considerably. Figure 10 shows the welfare changes across countries for 
the UNI and the LC scenario. Again, the welfare cost under LC is the light grey 
bar and under UNI, it is the sum of the light and dark grey bars. 
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Except for France and the Southern European Countries (SEU) without Italy, 
all countries gain from importing allowances compared to a scenario without 
trading. The degree to which they gain depends on two factors: 
•  The strictness of the national Kyoto-target relative to the business-as-
usual emissions, and 
•  The differences in abatement costs across different Member States. 
Both of these factors are illustrated by the implicit CO2-taxes necessary to 
achieve the Kyoto-targets unilaterally (see Figure 5 in section 4.2). The largest 
gains from ETS accrue to the Benelux countries (BEN) and Austria and Ireland 
(REU) because they experience the largest difference between allowance 
price and unilateral tax rate. 
France experiences no gains from trading in the ETS although it has the same 
implicit unilateral CO2-tax as Germany, which can lower its welfare, costs from 
1.2 percent to 1.0 percent. This is due to the fact that France is not trading 
many allowances because of its low emission intensity in the electricity sector. 
Hence, it can not reap large gains from trading, as much of the emission 
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Figure 10 —  Welfare  Loss  Under  the  Least-Cost Allocation (LC) and Under 












A special case is that of the accession countries. It is surprising to see that 
these countries lose welfare compared to the BAU scenario (0.4 percent) even 
though they do not face as strong an an emission constraint as the EU15. The 
income received through the export of allowances marks the gains from 
allowance trading. Yet, there are some costs as well. By joining the ETS, ACC 
producers in the ETS face different relative prices for energy thus reducing 
their competitiveness as soon as they choose to reduce emissions in order to 
export certificates. This shows up in the simulations in the form of lower 
production and lower exports mainly in the energy intensive iron, metal and 
steel sector (IMS) which traditionally has a comparative advantage on 
international markets. It also carries over to non-ETS sectors through higher 
input and energy prices coming from ETS-sectors. 
By comparing the welfare loss to ACC in the ETS to the unilateral scenario 
(UNI) we can identify the impact of the ETS. Under UNI, the region ACC 
experiences a welfare gain of 0.1 percent relative to BAU. This gain is due to 
the competitive advantage of ACC producers relative to the EU15 producers. 
ACC exports energy-intensive products to the rest of the EU because their   28
production cost including the emission constraint rise more than those in ACC. 
The introduction of the trading scheme raises allowance prices in the ACC 
such that the comparative advantage of the energy-intensive sectors is 
reduced. This adverse trade effect can not be compensated by the income 
received from exporting allowances, as the volume is too small. However, if 
the ACC would use some of their hot-air, they could reduce allowance prices 
thus reducing the burden to their ETS sectors and at the same time increase 
the income from exporting allowances. In fact, with a supply of 25 percent of 
the hot-air available the welfare loss could be reduced to zero. Larger amounts 
of hot-air would even lead to a welfare gain for ACC of 0.8 percent relative to 
BAU. 
Finally, it is also interesting to look at the welfare effects of the optimal 
scenario (OPT), which is not shown for each region here. In this scenario, all 
Member States are better off than in the LC scenario. This also holds for the 
Benelux countries and Ireland, Austria, for which this scenario implies very 
strict targets for the ETS sectors (see figure 2). The accession countries do not 
lose welfare in this scenario but gain 1.4 percent welfare relative to BAU.  
5.  Summary and Conclusions 
The upcoming EU emissions trading scheme (ETS) for CO2 evokes 
ambiguous reactions. Proponents advertise its contribution to the minimizing of 
the cost of meeting the European Kyoto targets. Opponents such as some 
policy makers and industry fear that it will have negative competitiveness 
effects for the participating sectors. So far, both positions have been based 
more on interested speculations than on sound modelling results. Indeed, the 
eventual results of the ETS are difficult to predict as long as the National 
Allocation Plans of the EU Member States are not determined. In this paper, 
we have used the DART-model to simulate the ETS under different likely 
allocation plans. To focus on the results of different allocation methods per se, 
we did not include JI and CDM credits. The results reveal new details about   29
the likely allowance prices, about allowance trade flows as well as about cost 
savings and competitiveness effects that differ considerably across different 
allocation modes. It should be kept in mind though, that many governments 
already plan to purchase certificates from JI and CDM projects, which will 
decrease permit demand in the ETS and drive down allowance prices. 
The first striking result is that the accession countries will be the only countries 
selling allowances, even without hot-air being included in the simulations. 
Their low cost abatement opportunities reduce the costs of reaching the 
European Kyoto targets considerably. This is for instance reflected in the 
difference between the allowance price (in the year 2012 when the ETS is in 
full operation) of 11 €2000/t CO2 if the accession countries are included in the 
ETS and 21 €2000/t CO2 if the accession countries would not participate. 
The second main finding concerns the division of the costs of reaching the 
Kyoto targets between the sectors inside the ETS and those not participating. 
Given the Kyoto targets, the share of emissions allocated to the ETS 
automatically determines the emission reductions that are necessary in the 
sectors that do not participate in emissions trading. The optimal, cost 
minimizing allocation would be one that equalizes the marginal abatement 
costs of the Kyoto target across all EU economies, e.g. through a trading 
scheme including all CO2 emissions. The efficiency gains from the ETS 
depend strongly on the allocation plan that allocates the caps to the ETS and 
the non-ETS sectors. If the allocation plan is not based on abatement costs, 
but on actual or expected emissions the efficiency gains from trading 
allowances are partially or even completely offset by the distortions created 
between the ETS and the non-ETS sectors. In particular, the simulations show 
that such an allocation mode would in general lead to a higher amount of 
allowances allocated to the ETS than a least-cost approach. This, in turn, 
implies lower allowance prices (7 €2000/t CO2  instead of optimally 
14 €2000/t CO2) but also higher taxes in the non ETS sectors (on average 
39 €2000/t CO2 instead of 14 €2000/t CO2). As a result the ETS under historical or 
under expected emission shares does not lead to a welfare gain. Only an   30
allocation rule with least-cost reductions clearly improves efficiency and 
creates welfare gains. These simulation results are based on the assumption 
of an efficient climate policy in the sectors outside the ETS. If, as it is to be 
expected, current inefficient instruments are tightened instead of being 
replaced by efficient ones, the distorting effects would be even larger thus 
further limiting the positive contribution of the ETS to overall welfare. However, 
this is not due to defects of the ETS itself but to the lack of a broader coverage 
of the ETS across all emitting sectors. 
Turning to the competitiveness effects it should be clear that it is not the 
trading scheme that imposes new restrictions but the Kyoto-target itself. The 
ETS is only a means to achieve this target at higher or smaller social cost. If 
the ETS were to be introduced throughout the EU and if it would cover all 
sectors it would lead to considerable welfare gains compared to a situation 
where the Kyoto-targets need to be reached unilaterally. Even though this is 
not the case, under the least cost allocation (Scenario LC) there are still gains 
to be made from trading. One of the most remarkable simulation results is, that 
indeed all sectors gain from trade – not only the sectors participating in 
emissions trading. In addition, the overall competitiveness effects of the Kyoto-
targets can become quite small with the help of the ETS. In our simulations, 
total output in Europe decreases by less than 0.5 percent compared to a 
business as usual scenario. Output in all non-energy sectors falls by less than 
2 percent. Only the fossil fuel and energy sectors naturally face higher losses. 
Finally, it is not true that the competitiveness of the ETS sectors is affected 
more than the competitiveness of the sectors outside. To the contrary, ETS 
sectors gain considerably from the cheap abatement opportunities in the 
accession countries. This gain is represented by the differences between the 
allowance price of 11 €2000/t CO2 in the ETS and the average tax outside the 
ETS of 23 €2000/t CO2.   31
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